Glass-Steagall Repeal: 26 Years On, the Wall Is Still Down

PatreonGlobal Watchdog is reader-supported, with no advertisers and no government entity to answer to. If you enjoyed this article, you can help keep it coming with a one-time donation or monthly support: Support on PatreonDonate on Ko-fi
Share this article:

28 min read

Last updated

On November 12, 1999, President Bill Clinton signed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and the wall American law had kept between commercial banking and investment banking since the Great Depression came down with a signature. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers praised the law as a financial system built for the 21st century, one that would help American companies compete. The Senate had passed it 90 to 8. The House passed it 362 to 57. Wall Street had tried to kill the old law for decades before that night. Senator Elizabeth Warren has counted a dozen failed attempts before the one that finally worked.

I first wrote this article in September 2014, nearly 15 years after the repeal. It is now more than 26 years on, and the receipts have piled up. The giants got bigger. Congress loosened the replacement rules in 2018. Three banks failed in 2023 under the looser line, and the biggest bank in the country got bigger still by buying one of the bodies. Congress has now written half a firewall for digital dollars while leaving the old wall in pieces. The question is no longer whether the repeal mattered in 1999. It is why, with everything we have watched since, the wall is still down.

Last updated October 7, 2026: full rewrite, 26 years after the Glass-Steagall repeal. I first published this in September 2014 and have rebuilt it from the ground up: newest Federal Reserve, FDIC, and IMF numbers, the 2023 bank failures, the stablecoin fight, and the honest other side of the argument over whether the repeal caused 2008.

The Short Version

  • The Glass-Steagall Act, part of the Banking Act of 1933, separated commercial banks from investment banks. Congress repealed that separation in 1999, and the largest banks merged into giants that held insured deposits and ran trading operations under one roof.
  • In 2018, Congress raised the strict supervision line from 50 billion dollars to 250 billion dollars in assets. In 2023, Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, and First Republic Bank all failed under that line, and the Federal Reserve review blamed the looser tailoring in part.
  • By June 30, 2026, the four biggest banks held a cumulative 42 percent of the assets in the Federal Reserve ranking of domestically chartered commercial banks. Failure now ends with the biggest bank buying the body.
  • No Glass-Steagall revival bill exists in the 119th Congress. The newest firewall fight is over stablecoins, and Congress built only half of that wall in 2025.

What Glass-Steagall Actually Did

Start with the mechanics, because getting them right keeps a hostile reader from knocking the whole argument down on one technicality. Glass-Steagall was the common name for parts of the Banking Act of 1933, passed in the depths of the Great Depression after thousands of banks had failed and taken their depositors down with them. Its two load-bearing provisions were Section 20 and Section 32. Section 20 barred banks in the Federal Reserve system from affiliating with firms mainly in the business of issuing, underwriting, or dealing in securities. Section 32 barred the same banks from sharing officers and directors with securities firms. In plain English, the institution that held your checking account could not also be the institution gambling on Wall Street, and the two could not share a management suite.

The same 1933 statute created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the FDIC, so that when a bank did fail, ordinary depositors got their money back. Put the two halves together and the original bargain is clear. The government would insure the deposits, and in exchange the insured side of banking stayed boring. Speculation happened somewhere else, with somebody else’s money.

What followed was the quietest stretch in American banking history. Bank failures shrank from a national catastrophe to a local news item. That quiet was not an accident of the times. It was a design choice, and it held, with the law chipped at the edges, for more than six decades.

The Night the Wall Came Down

The rationale sold to Congress in the 1990s was competition. American banks, the argument went, needed to grow larger to fight foreign rivals, and an outdated 1933 law had tied their hands. Japanese and German giants would swallow the world unless American banks were allowed to become behemoths too. It was a rescue story, and Congress loved playing the hero.

One detail gives the game away. The merger that defined the era, Travelers Group joining Citicorp to form Citigroup in 1998, happened a year before the law changed. The 1999 act did not so much open the gate as ratify the fact that the biggest bank in the country had already walked through it. Bank of America’s sprawl owed plenty to the 1994 interstate banking law, too. The repeal did not build the giants in a day. It removed the fence that would have stopped them, and blessed the one that had jumped early.

So on November 12, 1999, the wall came down, 90 to 8 in the Senate and 362 to 57 in the House, signed by a Democratic president and praised by his Treasury secretary as a system for the 21st century. Summers said it would better enable American companies to compete in the new economy. Boy, was he ever wrong. What it enabled, first and fastest, was size.

Timeline: 1933 Glass-Steagall Banking Act, 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley repeal, 2010 Dodd-Frank, 2018 threshold raised from 50 billion to 250 billion dollars, 2023 bank failures, 2025 GENIUS Act.

Chart: The law in one line, from the Banking Act of 1933 to the GENIUS Act of 2025. Sources: Congress.gov; Public Law 115-174; FDIC.

Rise of the Vampire Squid Banks

In July 2009, Matt Taibbi wrote in Rolling Stone that Goldman Sachs was a great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity. The image stuck because it was accurate in the way good metaphors are accurate. The repeal had not merely let banks get big. It had let insured deposits, taxpayer backing, and the cheapest funding in the economy flow toward institutions whose culture treated risk as a revenue line.

My younger self overstated one part of this, and the record deserves correcting. The original article claimed the new law let banks buy and control everything from oil fields to airports. Read the Federal Reserve’s own descriptions and the real authority is narrower, and in some ways worse for being respectable. The big financial holding companies won authority over physical commodities such as oil and metals, over energy tolling and energy management arrangements, and over merchant banking stakes in ordinary companies, hedged about with conditions. The bankers never needed to buy the electric company outright. Controlling the fuel, the hedge, and the loan was quite enough.

Everyone told us deregulation was essential and that we had too many regulations. Fewer rules sounds great in theory. It is not always a great idea when the subject is Wall Street, where billions move every day and the personalities are not famous for humility. Letting the industry write its own limits is like turning the keys of the asylum over to the inmates and calling it reform. Sometimes the boring rule is the whole point.

Vampyroteuthis infernalis, the vampire squid, illustrated by Carl Chun in 1903 (public domain). Matt Taibbi borrowed the name for Wall Street's biggest banks.

The real vampire squid, Vampyroteuthis infernalis, from Carl Chun’s 1903 scientific plate, public domain, via Wikimedia Commons. Taibbi’s squid was a metaphor. This one is the genuine article, and considerably less dangerous.

The Giants Today

When Warren introduced her revival bill in 2013, she warned that the four biggest banks were then 30 percent larger than they had been just five years earlier. Here is the current count from the Federal Reserve’s own ranking of domestically chartered commercial banks, June 30, 2026:

BankConsolidated assetsCumulative share of the ranking
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association4.09 trillion dollars16 percent
Bank of America, National Association2.65 trillion dollars27 percent
Citibank, National Association1.98 trillion dollars35 percent
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association1.91 trillion dollars42 percent

Source: Federal Reserve, U.S. Domestically Chartered Commercial Banks, June 30, 2026, covering 3,765 banks holding about 25.18 trillion dollars in consolidated assets. Four banks. Forty-two cents of every dollar in the ranking. And the wall between the casino and your checking account is still down.

Bar chart of assets at the four largest U.S. banks on June 30, 2026: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA 4.09 trillion dollars, Bank of America NA 2.65 trillion, Citibank NA 1.98 trillion, Wells Fargo Bank NA 1.91 trillion, 42 percent cumulative share of the Federal Reserve ranking.

Chart: The Big Four by consolidated assets, with cumulative share of the Federal Reserve ranking. Source: Federal Reserve, U.S. Domestically Chartered Commercial Banks, June 30, 2026.

Two honest cautions about these numbers. First, they are bank level figures, the chartered banks themselves. At the holding company level, the New York Fed’s first quarter 2025 tally put JPMorgan Chase and Co. at about 4.36 trillion dollars, Bank of America Corp at about 3.35 trillion, Citigroup at about 2.57 trillion, and Wells Fargo and Co. at about 1.95 trillion. Different yardstick, same skyline. Second, the small end keeps shrinking: the FDIC counted 4,238 insured institutions in the second quarter of 2026, down from 4,421 a year earlier. The big end consolidates while the small end disappears. Both halves of that sentence matter.

The Honest Debate

Here is where I owe you the other side, stated fairly and with its sources named, because an argument that hides the opposing evidence is just advertising.

The official verdict came from the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, which concluded that the crisis was avoidable and that more than 30 years of deregulation and reliance on self regulation had stripped away safeguards, opening gaps in oversight of the shadow banking system and over the counter derivatives. That is the majority. It is not the whole commission. The dissenting view, presented to the House Financial Services Committee by Douglas Holtz-Eakin, held that the investigation showed no contribution from the repeal of Glass-Steagall to the financial crisis and no real role for repeal or proprietary trading. Paul Krugman has called the repeal a mistake but not the cause of the crisis. Joseph Stiglitz argued that the deepest effect of repeal was cultural, a shift toward leverage and risk inside institutions that used to be paid to be careful.

The other side also has its favorite exhibits, and they are real ones. Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns failed in 2008 without large insured depositories attached, which is the standard proof that repeal was not the mechanism of the collapse. Canada never had Glass-Steagall separation at all. Its investment banks joined its retail banks, and Canada had no bank failures and no government bank bailouts in 2008. An NBER working paper by Bordo, Redish, and Rockoff attributes that long run stability to a concentrated system of large diversified institutions, which is roughly the opposite of the prescription this article supports.

Lehman Brothers headquarters at Times Square in New York City, photographed before the firm's 2008 collapse

Lehman Brothers headquarters at Times Square. Photo by David Shankbone, CC BY, via Wikimedia Commons. Lehman had no insured depository attached, and it failed anyway, which is the strongest single exhibit on the other side of this argument.

Now my position, plainly. I support restoring a modern Glass-Steagall, because the honest question was never only which corpse fell in 2008. Lehman did not need insured deposits to fail. The question is what the public insures, what the public backstops, and what behavior gets rewarded once a bank knows both answers. The repeal let the institutions that hold the public’s insured money adopt the trading floor’s appetite, and it told every large bank in America that size itself was a form of insurance. On that question, the dissent has never had much to say.

Dodd-Frank and the Great Loosening

After the collapse, Congress answered with the Dodd-Frank Act, signed July 21, 2010. Its centerpiece for this argument was the Volcker Rule, a ban on proprietary trading by banks and their affiliates. Paul Volcker himself said he did not like the rule that bore his name. He would have preferred a bill of about four pages banning proprietary trading and making the board and the chief executive responsible for compliance. What he got was thousands of pages that only bankers could parse, which is roughly what happens when the regulated get to hold the pen. NPR documented in 2013 that most lines of one House bill matched language written by Citigroup lobbyists. The teenagers were, once again, writing the household rules.

Then came the loosening, and this is the part my 2014 article could not have known. The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 115-174, signed May 24, 2018, raised the line for enhanced prudential standards from 50 billion dollars in assets to 250 billion dollars, and exempted banks at or under 10 billion dollars from the Volcker Rule entirely. The leash did not just stay loose. It got longer. No new Volcker change has been proposed in 2025 or 2026, so the 2019 and 2020 revisions remain the operative ones. Remember that 250 billion dollar number. It matters shortly.

LawWhat it didWhere it stands
Glass-Steagall (Banking Act of 1933)Separated insured commercial banks from securities underwriting and dealing, Sections 20 and 32. Created FDIC deposit insurance.Affiliation bans repealed in 1999. The FDIC remains.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999)Let bank holding companies own securities and insurance firms, ending the separation.In force. The law of the land since November 12, 1999.
Dodd-Frank Act (2010), as amended 2018Volcker Rule ban on proprietary trading, enhanced supervision for large banks. The 2018 amendment moved the strict supervision line from 50 billion to 250 billion dollars.In force as amended. The loosened version is the one that met 2023.
21st Century Glass-Steagall Act (proposed 2013, 2015, 2017)Would separate FDIC insured banks from investment banking, swaps dealing, hedge funds, and private equity.Never enacted. No revival bill exists in the 119th Congress.

The capital fight continues in the background. On March 19, 2026, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the OCC requested comment on three proposals to modernize the capital framework and implement the final components of Basel III for the largest banks, with comments due June 18, 2026. Agency projections reported with the proposals put common equity tier 1 requirements down 4.8 percent for the largest banks, and Vice Chair Bowman stated a goal of finalizing the rulemaking by the end of 2026. Twenty-six years after the wall came down, the pending question in Washington is still whether the biggest banks should hold a little less capital. Some arguments Washington settles. This one it just renews.

The Bill Comes Due: 2023

Chart showing Signature Bank at 110 billion dollars, Silicon Valley Bank at 209 billion, and First Republic Bank at 229 billion in assets at failure, all below the 250 billion dollar enhanced standards line set in 2018. Source: FDIC.

Chart: The supervision line moved from 50 billion dollars to 250 billion dollars in 2018, and where the three 2023 failures sat beneath it. Sources: Public Law 115-174; FDIC failed bank list.

On March 10, 2023, Silicon Valley Bank failed. The FDIC failed bank list records about 209 billion dollars in assets and about 175.4 billion dollars in deposits, the second largest bank failure in American history at that moment. When First Citizens took over the bridge bank, it held about 167 billion dollars in assets and about 119 billion dollars in deposits. The distance between those two sets of numbers is the run itself, measured by the government.

On March 12, 2023, Signature Bank failed, with about 110.4 billion dollars in assets and about 88.6 billion dollars in deposits. That same day, the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC announced a systemic risk exception for both banks, meaning every depositor, insured and uninsured alike, would be made whole, with the losses tied to uninsured depositors recovered through a special assessment on the industry. On May 1, 2023, First Republic Bank failed, at about 229.1 billion dollars in assets and about 103.9 billion dollars in deposits. JPMorgan Chase Bank assumed all of its deposits and substantially all of its assets in a least cost purchase and assumption deal. No systemic risk exception there. Just a sale, and the largest bank in America walked away larger.

Notice where all three sat. Silicon Valley at roughly 209 to 212 billion dollars. First Republic at about 229 billion. Signature at about 110 billion. Every one of them under the 250 billion dollar line Congress drew in 2018, the line that said institutions this size no longer needed automatic enhanced standards. The Federal Reserve graded its own homework afterward. Its review of the Silicon Valley failure, released April 28, 2023 and led by Vice Chair for Supervision Michael Barr, listed four causes, and one of them was that the post 2018 tailoring approach had impeded effective supervision. The 2014 version of this article argued about 1933 in the abstract. The 2026 version gets to argue about a specific number, and the number failed.

FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund cost estimates for the 2023 bank failures: Silicon Valley Bank 20 billion dollars first estimate, 16.1 billion latest; Signature Bank 2.5 billion, then 2.4 billion; First Republic Bank 13 billion.

Chart: What the 2023 failures cost the Deposit Insurance Fund, first estimate against latest figure, per bank. Source: FDIC.

The rescue also came with an itemized bill, and it is public record. The FDIC first estimated Silicon Valley’s cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund at about 20 billion dollars, later revised to about 16.1 billion. Signature’s cost was first estimated at about 2.5 billion dollars, and the FDIC Inspector General’s material loss review put it at about 2.4 billion. First Republic’s estimated cost was about 13 billion dollars. Then the special assessment priced the depositor protection itself: the FDIC’s final rule of November 16, 2023 attributed about 16.3 billion dollars to protecting uninsured depositors at the two systemic risk banks, collected at about 13.4 basis points a year over eight quarters starting in 2024, across roughly 114 banking organizations, with no bank under 5 billion dollars paying. By the end of 2023 the FDIC had raised that figure to about 20.4 billion dollars. The old debate ran on metaphors. The new one has receipts.

Too Big to Fail Is a Business Model

For years, critics alleged that the biggest banks borrowed at a discount because lenders assumed the government would never let them fail. The International Monetary Fund measured it. In its April 2014 Global Financial Stability Report, the IMF estimated the funding advantage for systemically important banks in the United States at about 60 basis points in 2009 and about 15 basis points in 2013, worth an estimated 15 billion to 70 billion dollars in 2011 to 2012 alone. The Richmond Fed’s Bailout Barometer tells the longer story: the share of financial system liabilities backed by explicit or implicit government guarantees grew from about 45 percent in 1999, the year the wall came down, to about 60 percent in 2016. The safety net did not shrink after the crisis. It metastasized.

The 2023 failures added a second mechanism, quieter than any bailout. When First Republic went down at about 229 billion dollars in assets, the government’s least cost answer was to sell it to JPMorgan Chase Bank, which by June 30, 2026 held about 4.09 trillion dollars in consolidated assets and 16 percent of the Federal Reserve ranking all by itself. Too big to fail used to be a story about rescues. It is now also a story about consolidation, repeated at every large failure, each time by official choice. A nice racket, if you are the one holding the bid card. Even the Cosa Nostra would envy a business where your competitor’s funeral is your growth strategy and the government catered the reception.

The Risk Moved to the Shadows

Here is the strongest new argument for updating the old law instead of photocopying it. The Financial Stability Board’s Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation, published December 16, 2025 with data through the end of 2024, found that non-bank financial intermediation grew 9.4 percent in 2024 to 256.8 trillion dollars, equal to 51 percent of total global financial assets. The narrow measure of bank like credit intermediation rose 12 percent to 76.3 trillion dollars. More than half the system, in other words, now sits outside the chartered banking system a new Glass-Steagall would rebuild. A wall around the banks alone is a wall around half the city.

The big number: $256.8 trillion. That is non-bank financial intermediation at the end of 2024, 51 percent of total global financial assets (Financial Stability Board, December 2025). A new firewall drawn only around chartered banks would speak to about half the system.

Regulators increasingly point at private credit, the vast lending business run by non-bank funds, as the current watch item, and the honest version of that concern needs no invented figures. Credit that used to sit on bank balance sheets, supervised and examined, now sits in vehicles that answer to investors instead of examiners. When you regulate the banks, the gambling moves next door. A serious modern bill has to speak to both houses on the street.

The New Firewall Is Digital

The 1933 question, who may touch insured deposits and on what terms, is being re-litigated right now over digital dollars. The GENIUS Act, sponsored by Senator Bill Hagerty, became Public Law 119-27 on July 18, 2025, after passing the House 308 to 122 and the Senate 68 to 30. It sets the first federal framework for payment stablecoins, and read closely, it is half a firewall. Issuers must back their coins at least 1 to 1 with high quality liquid assets such as dollars, bank deposits, and short term Treasuries, keep reserves segregated, publish monthly reserve reports, and submit to third party examination. Issuers are prohibited from paying holders interest or yield simply for holding the coin. And the boundary could not be plainer: payment stablecoins are not backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, are not guaranteed by the federal government, and are not subject to FDIC deposit insurance, and claiming otherwise is unlawful. FDIC Chair Travis Hill has said the same thing out loud: the act gives the FDIC no authority to guarantee stablecoin deposits, and issuers may not dress their coins in the FDIC’s clothes.

Now the other half of the story. On March 28, 2025, the FDIC issued Financial Institution Letter FIL-7-2025, rescinding its 2022 guidance and clarifying that supervised banks may engage in permissible crypto related activities, including custody, holding stablecoin reserves, issuing digital assets, and market making, without prior FDIC approval, provided they manage the risks. The OCC moved the same direction: Interpretive Letter 1183 in March 2025 reaffirmed crypto custody, certain stablecoin activities, and node participation as permissible for national banks, and Interpretive Letter 1188 in December 2025 confirmed that national banks may engage in riskless principal crypto asset transactions. In July 2025 the three agencies issued a joint statement on risk management for banks holding crypto assets for customers. So the pattern of 1999 repeats in miniature: Congress built a partial wall around the new asset, and the regulators simultaneously opened the bank door to it. I would rather we not run that experiment on your savings account.

Elizabeth Warren and the Fight That Outlived McCain

Cover of A Fighting Chance by Elizabeth WarrenThe political history here has a hinge, and her name is on it. Elizabeth Warren proposed the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, was blocked from running it, ran for the Senate instead, and beat an incumbent while Wall Street spent heavily against her. In July 2013 she introduced the 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act with an unlikely partner set: Republican John McCain, Democrat Maria Cantwell, and independent Angus King. Their bill would have separated FDIC insured traditional banks from investment banking, insurance, swaps dealing, and hedge fund and private equity activities. It was reintroduced in 2015 and again in April 2017. It was never enacted. John McCain died on August 25, 2018, and the bill’s bipartisan spine went with him. Her book A Fighting Chance is still the clearest first person account of that fight, and I recommend it without reservation.

Elizabeth Warren, official U.S. Senate portrait, 114th Congress (public domain).

Senator Elizabeth Warren, official Senate portrait, public domain. Ranking Member of the Senate Banking Committee in the 119th Congress, still asking the questions.

Where does she stand now? As of the 119th Congress, Warren is Ranking Member of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, the top Democrat, with Senator Tim Scott holding the chairman’s gavel. Back in 2014 I hoped she would become chairperson of that committee. She never did, and the honest rewrite of that hope is past tense. What she has instead is the minority’s megaphone, and she uses it. On November 20, 2025, she joined Senators Wyden and Blumenthal in urging the acting CFPB director to reinstate the Personal Financial Data Rights rule. On September 15, 2026, she took the Senate floor to oppose the Republican led Digital Asset Market Clarity Act procedural vote and call for a negotiated bipartisan crypto bill. The beat has changed from building the wall to guarding the rubble, and she is still on it.

The politics inverted somewhere along the way, and the record shows it. The 2016 Republican platform included support for reinstating the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. The 2024 Republican platform lists 20 promises and the plank is simply gone. In 2017 the new administration flashed signals in both directions: National Economic Council Director Gary Cohn told lawmakers he generally favored separating consumer lending from investment banking, and then Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin told Warren the administration supported aspects of Glass-Steagall but not breaking up banks, and that the President did not support breaking up the big banks. Nothing came of any of it. As of this writing there is no Glass-Steagall revival bill in the 119th Congress; the most recent House attempt was H.R.2714, the Return to Prudent Banking Act of 2023. The story is no longer one party against Wall Street. It is a public record of which party, if either, still wants the wall.

The Revolving Door: Eric Cantor

Eric Cantor, official U.S. House portrait, 113th Congress (public domain).

Eric Cantor, official portrait, 2012, public domain work of the U.S. House of Representatives. House majority leader, then Moelis and Company, then the pharmaceutical lobby.

Remember Eric Cantor? The former House majority leader lost the June 2014 Republican primary to Dave Brat, in a race where crony capitalism was the challenger’s whole argument. Cantor resigned from Congress on August 18, 2014, and by September he had joined Moelis and Company, the investment bank, as a vice chairman with a board seat. Moelis told the world he would help them navigate the difficult terrain around Washington. His own company’s SEC filing priced that navigation: a compensation package of about 3.4 million dollars across his first two years, including a 400,000 dollar salary, 400,000 dollars in signing cash, and a million dollars in restricted stock units. A terrain guide, it turns out, is a man who just walked out of the building and still has the keys.

Twelve years on, the exhibit updated itself. On September 29, 2026, Cantor was announced as the incoming president and chief executive officer of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, PhRMA, the drug industry’s trade association. Majority leader to Wall Street to the pharma lobby, each door better paid than the last. I am not going to pretend these hires are about specialized expertise. Cantor is a lawyer whose marketable asset, stated and restated, is access to the friends and former colleagues he left behind. The door is still turning. Now it has a second industry on the other side of it.

What a 21st Century Glass-Steagall Would Have to Do Now

So what would a serious modern version have to do? Three jobs, and none of them is a photocopy of 1933. First, it would have to fix the threshold question. The 2018 experiment put the strict supervision line at 250 billion dollars, and three banks failed beneath it inside eight weeks, with the Federal Reserve itself naming the tailoring as part of the failure. A modern law either puts the line back down or ties supervision to risk instead of raw size. Second, it would have to speak to the shadow half of the system, the 256.8 trillion dollars of non-bank intermediation the FSB counts, because a firewall that covers only chartered banks covers about half the risk. Third, it would have to finish the digital firewall: the GENIUS Act built the reserve and insurance boundaries for stablecoins, while the 2025 agency guidance opened bank doors to crypto activities, and those two policies have not yet been introduced to each other.

The pending fights are smaller and tell the same story. The Basel III endgame proposals of March 2026 would trim capital requirements at the largest banks while Washington argues about it. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the agency Warren designed, spent this era being dismantled in public: Director Rohit Chopra was removed in February 2025, his successor ordered staff to stop work and closed the headquarters, and Public Law 119-21, signed July 4, 2025, cut the bureau’s funding cap from 12 percent to 6.5 percent of the Federal Reserve’s 2009 operating expenses, an estimated 446 million dollars against 823 million under the old formula, with the Congressional Budget Office estimating 2 billion dollars of savings over 10 years. A Senate Banking Committee minority report estimated the first year of that retrenchment cost consumers up to 19 billion dollars, and a follow up put the total at up to 26.5 billion; those are the minority’s estimates and should be labeled as such, and even discounted, they describe an agency being unplugged, not reformed.

One voice from the other side of the old barricade deserves the last word in this section. Sandy Weill, the banker who engineered the 1998 Travelers and Citigroup merger that the 1999 law then blessed, went on CNBC in July 2012 and called for splitting commercial banks from investment banks, in effect restoring Glass-Steagall. The company he built became the biggest lender in the world before taking a 45 billion dollar taxpayer bailout in 2008. When the architect of the megabank says the building is unsafe, I am inclined to believe him about the structure, however late the confession arrives.

Editorial cartoon by Tom Toles

Cartoon by Tom Toles.

Frequently Asked Questions

What was the Glass-Steagall Act?

It was the common name for parts of the Banking Act of 1933, passed during the Great Depression. Sections 20 and 32 barred commercial banks that held insured deposits from affiliating with investment banks that underwrote and traded securities, and the same law created the FDIC, which insures your deposits. The bargain was simple: the government insures the boring side of banking, so the boring side stays boring.

When was Glass-Steagall repealed, and by what law?

On November 12, 1999, President Bill Clinton signed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, also called the Financial Services Modernization Act. It passed the Senate 90 to 8 and the House 362 to 57, and it repealed the Section 20 and Section 32 affiliation bans, clearing the way for the megabank mergers that followed.

Did the repeal of Glass-Steagall cause the 2008 financial crisis?

Honest answer: experts who studied it still disagree. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission majority blamed decades of deregulation and gaps in oversight, while the dissent, as Douglas Holtz-Eakin presented it, found no contribution from the repeal. Paul Krugman called repeal a mistake but not the cause, and Joseph Stiglitz argued its deepest effect was cultural. Canada, with no separation law at all, had no bank failures in 2008. My position is stated in this article: whatever started the fire, the repeal decided whose money was standing next to it, and the public has underwritten the answer ever since.

Are stablecoins insured by the FDIC?

No. Under the GENIUS Act of 2025, payment stablecoins are not backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, are not guaranteed by the federal government, and are not subject to FDIC deposit insurance or NCUA share insurance. It is unlawful for an issuer to claim otherwise, and FDIC Chair Travis Hill has said the agency has no authority to guarantee stablecoin deposits.

Is there a Glass-Steagall bill in Congress now?

Not in the 119th Congress, as of October 2026. The 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act was introduced in 2013 by Senators Warren, McCain, Cantwell, and King and reintroduced in 2015 and 2017, but it was never enacted. The most recent House revival attempt was H.R.2714, the Return to Prudent Banking Act of 2023, in the previous Congress.

Final Thoughts

I will close with the argument Dennis Kelleher, president and chief executive of Better Markets, has been making for years, because it summarizes this entire article in one move. Banks do not commit crimes. Bankers do. Until individual executives are held personally and meaningfully accountable, everyone should expect more of the same conduct. Letting a bank pay a fine with shareholder money, deduct it, and conceal the individuals involved does not punish anyone who made a decision. It just invoices the owners. Perhaps if a few of the people responsible for billions in damage had traded their tailored suits for prison orange and been fined out of their own pockets, we would not need quite so many new laws. They have had no reason to fear prosecution, and an industry with nothing to fear will eventually do anything profitable. That is the whole history you just read.

Cover of Beyond Outrage by Robert ReichIf you want to go deeper, Robert Reich’s Beyond Outrage connects the banking story to the wider hollowing of the middle class, and Joseph Stiglitz’s The Price of Inequality makes the cultural argument, that repeal taught careful institutions to gamble, better than anyone. I have read them, argued with them, and recommend them anyway.

As an Amazon Associate, we earn from qualifying purchases.

So here is my question for you, and I mean it literally. If the next crash comes, should the bankers who caused it go to prison, or are fines just the cost of doing business to you? Tell me what you think in the comments.

References

Keep the watchdog independent

If this article saved you money, time, or a headache, if you enjoyed it, or if you want to support local investigative journalism, you can buy me a coffee by card. No account needed, and Ko-fi takes no cut, so it all goes to the work.

Buy me a coffee

Prefer steady support? Join the Patreon for monthly backing.

Dr. Alan Wood
Dr. Alan Wood

Musings of an unabashed and unapologetic truth-seeker. Crusader against obscurantism. Optimistic curmudgeon, snark jockey, lovably opinionated purveyor of wisdom and truth. Multilingual world traveler and part-time irreverent philosopher who dabbles in writing, political analysis, and social commentary. Attempting to provide some sanity and clarity to complex issues with a dash of sardonic wit and humor. Thanks for visiting!

My byline rests on 24 years in the classroom: three years teaching in Japanese junior and senior high schools, ten years as an associate professor at Japanese universities, and eleven years teaching Spanish in Georgia public schools. I hold a PhD in Linguistics, and my EduLingo line of Spanish, ESOL, and French teaching resources is on Teachers Pay Teachers.

Enjoying Global Watchdog? Become a monthly supporter on Patreon and help keep independent journalism free for everyone — no paywall, no intrusive ads. Winston approves.

Articles: 602

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

© 2026 Global Watchdog Media And Commentary. All rights reserved.